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Discovering whether social capital endowments in modern societies have been subjected or not to a
process of gradual erosion is one of the most debated topics in recent economic literature. This new
stream of research has been inaugurated by Putnam’s pioneering studies about social capital trends in
the United States. Recently, a considerable work by Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) put a new emphasis
on this topic contending Easterlin’s assessment. Present work is aimed at analyzing the relationship
between changes in social capital and subjective well-being in western Europe considering 11 different
countries. In particular, I would like to answer questions such as: (1) is social capital in western Europe
declining? Is such erosion a general trend ofmodern societies or is it a characteristic feature of only some
of them? (2) social capital trend can help to explain subjectivewell-being trend? In so doing,my research
considers four different set of proxies of social capital controlling for time and socio-demographic aspects
in eleven different western European countries using World Values Survey (WVS) data between 1980
and 2000.My results are encouraging, showing evidence of a probable relationship between social capital
and happiness. Furthermore, my results show that during last 20 years western European citizens have
persistently lost confidence in the judicial system, in the church, in armed forces and the police. Finally,
considering single countries,wediscover thatUnitedKingdomis theonlycountry, among the investigated
ones, with a negative pattern for social capital: themajority of the proxies of social capital in UK declined
over the considered period.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Discoveringwhether social capital (SC) endowments inmodern
societies have been subjected or not to a process of gradual ero-
sion is one of themost debated topics in recent economic literature.
This new streamof research has been inaugurated by Putnam’s pio-
neering studies about SC trends in the United States. Considering
numerous proxies of SC, Putnam (2000) argues that during last 30
years USA experienced a decline in social relationships and in its
system of shared values and beliefs. From this point, much of the
literature on SC tries to find evidence to support or to contend this
statement. For a comprehensive review of such literature see Stolle
andHooghe (2004). Putnam’s findinghas been carefully scrutinised
by Paxton (1999); Robinson and Jackson (2001); Costa and Kahn
(2003), and Bartolini et al. (2008), while Ladd (1996) criticised this
evidence. “On balance, social capital has been confirmed as declin-
ing in the US, although not so dramatically as Putnam claimed.”1
All these studies are focused on the USA since similar research asks
∗ Corresponding aruthor.
E-mail address: f.sarracino@gmail.com.
1 See Bartolini et al. (2008).
for a generous database and the US General Social Survey (GSS)
offers a long lasting temporal data-series. Consequently, we do not
have much information about what happened in other countries
in the same period Putnam (2002), Van Deth et al. (2000). For that
reason the first question I would like to give an answer is: how is
doing Europe? is SC declining? is such erosion a general trend of
western societies or is it a characteristic feature of the American
one? To my knowledge only a few authors payed attention to this
aspect since only a few datasets are useful to establish a clear long-
termpatternArts andHalman (2004), VanOOrschot et al. (2006). In
2001 OECD2 dedicated to this topic a publication in which, beyond
others, dealt with the theme of trends in five European countries:
United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, France and Germany. The
report assesses that in general SC declined, in particular in United
Kingdom, while remaining countries show a more mixed pattern.
Another general perspective is offered by Leigh (2003). Con-
tributing to an entry on “Trends in social capital” he identifies
three common patterns of declining trust, political participation
and organizational activity across industrialized countries in the
2 See OECD (2001b), Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, Paris.
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period between 1980 and 1990. Among the five reviewed Euro-
pean countries (Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden) only
the Scandinavian one seems to have a positive trend even if civic
engagement is declining. Further studies have been conducted by
Norris (2004); Delhey andNewton (2005) but these studies focused
on particular indexes of SC or only on generalised trust and were
based on old data from the World Values Survey (WVS). A deeper
analysis was conducted by Morales (2004) on trends and levels of
associational participation in Europe. Looking at trends between
1980 and 2002 from theWVS and the European Social Survey (ESS)
she concludes that it is not possible to statewhether a clear increase
or decrease in general levels of membership exists. Anyway, her
analysis ismerely descriptive and, even if she focuses on a broad set
of countries, her conclusions do not account for other aspects, such
as socio-demographic variables, that can affect SC trends. Finally,
a more recent article by Adam (2008) observes trends of general-
ized trust and membership in voluntary organizations using data
from WVS in the period 1980–2000. The author finds evidence of
a non-eroding SC in Europe even if he warns about signs of decline
as well as improvement. He states that decline in trust in individu-
als is quite visible, while associational involvement shows a more
complex but on average positive trend.
Adam’swork is, tomyknowledge, themostup-to-date andcom-
plete research on European trends of SC. Anyway, it suffers some
limitations. First of all it is based on mean variations between the
starting and ending period. This is quite comprehensible since the
second aim of the author was to test the reliability of the WVS
vis-a-vis other databases (i.e. ESS), but in general this approach
does not allow to check for other factors; secondly the author
adopts only some of the available proxies of SC, namely generalized
trust, membership in voluntary organizations and unpaid volun-
tary work; finally, Adam focuses on a large number of European
countries including transition countries: this is an interestingpoint,
but misses to account for different economic realities (developed
and transition countries) preventing a more detailed knowledge of
what happened to SC during last 20 years.
In order to overcome these limitations, my research consid-
ers four different set of proxies of SC controlling for time and
socio-demographic aspects in eleven different western European
countries.Dataaredrawn fromtheWVS, adataset composedof four
waves between 1980 and 2000. In so doing, I am able to investigate
trends on a 20 years period.
The second question Iwould like to answer iswhether SC trends
can help to explain subjective well-being (SWB) trends. In a pio-
neering work Easterlin (1974) discovered that, using cross-section
data, on average richer people are also happier than poorer ones;
but a life-cycle analysis on the same sample shows that during
time income grew up while happiness stayed constant. Such a
puzzle is actually known as the “Easterlin paradox.” Starting from
this point an even more consistent part of the economic litera-
ture flourished trying to solve the problemBlanchower andOswald
(2004). Many different theories coming from manifold scientific
fields have been advanced so far, but until now they failed to
fully explain the paradox.3 Recently, Stevenson andWolfers (2008)
revive the debate challenging the existence of the paradox. Consid-
ering Europe and Japan they argue that societies get happier as
they become richer. That is to say that “money can buy happiness.”
Unfortunately, at the same time they state that “the failure of hap-
piness to rise in the United States remains a puzzling outlier.”4 In
this way the Easterlin paradox remains unsolved and also its non-
existence is not demonstrated. There is a need to further look into
the “black box” of the American case. From this point of view, some
3 For a reviewof themain theories advanced so farplease refer toSarracino (2008).
4 See Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), p. 16.
recent contributions by Helliwell (2001, 2002, 2006) propose SC as
an important aspect for SWBarguing thatmoneycannot explain the
whole variation in people well-being. To my knowledge, the paper
tackling most successfully with the challenge settled by Helliwell
is Bartolini et al. (2008)5 which argues that SC, and in particular
relational goods, is important for SWB. They donot deny the impor-
tance of income for happiness, but using data from the American
GSS between 1975 and 2004 they find out that U.S. SWB is largely
explained by four forces acting in different directions: (1) income
growth; (2) decreasing relational goods; (3) decreasing confidence
in institutions; (4) social comparisons. These four groups of vari-
ables allow to explain quite the whole variation in SWB. In other
words, the three authors suggests that American happiness did not
growup togetherwith economic growthbecause thepositive effect
of income growth was counterbalanced by the declining availabil-
ity of SC which negatively affects SWB. In this way they provide a
convincing and powerful explanation of the Easterlin paradox giv-
ing SC a new role: a higher income increases happiness as long as
it does not undermine SC Bartolini and Bonatti (2003). Whenever
this hypothesis would be corroborated by further research, policy
agendaswill have to consider also the effects of economic policy on
the preservation and the provision of social capital. Hence, SC can
become an important aspect of future development policies.
The theoryproposedbyBartolini et al. (2008) canhelp to explain
what happened in USA. A few example can probably be convincing.
Estimates fromthe threeauthors suggest that inpresenceof a stable
endowment of SC, and in particular of relational goods, Ameri-
can SWB would have been higher than the actual one. Similarly,
if income growth should compensate for the effect of the reduction
of SC on happiness, keeping this variable stable to its 1975 lev-
els, then the growth rate of GDP should have been more than 10%.
Finally, they also estimate that the positive effect of income growth
on SWB has been counterbalanced by the increase of other’s peo-
ple income (which offsets 2/3 of the effect of income growth) and
by the decrease in relational goods and confidence in institutions
(which accounts for 5/6 of the total effect of social comparisons on
SWB).
Concluding, the contribution by Bartolini et al. (2008) seems
to suggest that differences in SC trends can help to explain dif-
ferences in SWB trends. The aim of present work is to provide
further evidence to support this hypothesis looking at some Euro-
pean countries. Main results of my research are the following:
1. SC trends in the majority of the western European countries are
different from the American ones. Great Britain is the country
with the worst trend, among the investigated ones, for SC.
2. SWB trends in present sample of countries are generally positive
with the only exception of Great Britain.
3. SC and SWB trends for investigated European countries are com-
patible with a relational explanation of the Easterlin paradox.
Present work is structured in four sections: the first section
outlined my research questions and motivations behind them;
the second section points out data adopted for my research and
methodological aspects; the following section reports results from
different regressions considering various proxies of SC as depen-
dent variable and adopting time dummies and socio-economic
conditions as independent variables. Finally, some concluding
remarks will follow.
5 See Bartolini et al. (2008).
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2. Data and methodological aspects
The analysis of SC trends for different European countries asks
for a generous dataset. From this point of view, probably, the most
comprehensive database is represented byWVS. It is awide compi-
lation of surveys collected in more than 80 countries representing
more than 80% of the world’s population. It collects information on
sociocultural and political change observed on a randomly selected
sample of 300 to 4000 individuals per country. In particular the
database provides information on “individual beliefs about politics,
the economy, religious, social and ethical topics, personal finances,
familial and social relationships, happiness and life satisfaction.”6
Data have been collected in four waves (1980–1982; 1990–1991;
1995–1997and1999–2001) for a total of 267,870observations cov-
ering quite a long period of time—about 20 years. Anyway, the
sample available for present study is smaller since I focus on the
trend of SC indicators in a small subset of countries for which I
have enough observations during time. Furthermore, since my aim
is to checkwhether different economic systems have different per-
formances comparing Western Europe and USA, I also exclude all
those countries that have been subjected to any recent institutional
shock.7 Considered countries are: Italy, France, the Netherlands,
Belgium, United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden,
Norway and Finland.
Although SC has been longly a much debated topic, actually it
still lacks a commonly agreed definition Durlauf and Fafchamps,
2004, Tinggaard Svendsen et al., 2009. This topic has been devel-
oped and applied in many different social disciplines hence
different definitions have been advanced so far. Some of the fathers
of this concept propose different definitions for it. For example,
Pierre Bourdieu, probably the first scientist introducing this term,
defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of
more or less institutionalized relationships ofmutual acquaintance
and recognition ... which provides each of its members with the
backing of collectively-owned capital.”8 Such a definition focuses
on three important aspects of social capital: (1) the existence of
a network of individuals; (2) participation in this network; and
(3) social capital as a public good. Nonetheless, Bourdieu misses
to precisely identify social capital pointing on its sources: “the net-
work of relationships.” Differently, James Coleman proposes the
following definition: “social capital is the set of resources that
inhere in family relations and in community social organization
and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of a
child or a young person.”9 In Coleman’s view the network aspect
is less emphasized while he stresses the importance of the group
in which social relations constitute useful capital resources. Such
a concept can be related to the category of “bonding” social cap-
ital in contrast with that one of “bridging” social capital. Bonding
refers typically to “relations among members of families and eth-
nic groups. Bridging social capital refers to relations with distant
friends, associates and colleagues.”10 These are two different forms
of social capital that should be considered mutual. In fact, while
the first form gives particular groups of people “a sense of iden-
tity and common purpose, without bridging ties that transcend
various social divides (e.g. religion, ethnicity, socio-economic sta-
tus), bonding ties can become a basis for the pursuit of narrow
interests, and can actively exclude outsiders.”10 Such groups can
6 Bruni and Stanca (2006), p. 6.
7 Countries excluded from the sample are Spain, Portugal, Greece and Luxem-
bourg.
8 Quoted in Schuller et al. (2000), p. 5.
9 Quoted in Schuller et al. (2000), p. 6.
10 See OECD (2001b), p. 42.
be characterized by strong and co-operative norms, but low trust
and co-operation with the rest of society becoming a barrier to
social cohesion andpersonal development. Taking this aspect to the
extreme, stronggroup ties canbring toneglectwider “public” inter-
ests promoting socially destructive “rent-seeking” activities (Olson,
1982). Finally, Robert Putnam defines social capital the “features of
social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable participants to
act togethermore effectively to pursue shared objectives.”11 In this
way the author identifies crucial aspects of social capital specifying
their role in social relationships: they enable different people to
co-operate (even unconsciously) to reach common goals Putnam
(2001). Nonetheless, given the empirical nature of present work, I
opted for a more operating definition such as the one proposed by
Bartolini et al. (2008)whodefineSCas “the stockofbothnon-market
relations and beliefs concerning institutions that affect either utility
or production functions.”12 In this way the authors do not focus
solely on particular aspects of SC—networks, norms and trust—but
comprise all those aspects—material and immaterial—that can con-
tribute to developmutual trust and co-operation. In particular, they
point to two main aspects of SC: (1) every non-market relation-
ships among individuals which allow people to communicate each
other and to develop mutual trust. They define this aspect rela-
tional SC; (2) the system of values or believes that makes people
act coherently. Moreover, the authors propose a further distinction
in intrinsically and extrinsically motivated relational SC depending
on whether the incentives to act come from within or outside the
individual. They define intrinsic SC (alternatively defined as rela-
tional goods) those components “that enter into people’s utility
function”13; by extrinsic SC they mean those components that do
not “directly enter into people’s utility functions but are instru-
mental to something else that may be considered valuable.” This
distinction allows to go deeper in the analysis of the category of
relational SC. In fact, quoting Deci’s work (1971), they focus on
the non-instrumental nature of intrinsic motivated activities. This
peculiarity allows to focus on a broader point: non-market rela-
tions are not always intrinsic; there can be extrinsic relational SC
(or purely extrinsic) as well as intrinsic one.14
A further critical aspect about SC is how to measure it Durlauf
(2002).Differentproposalshavebeenadvanced, butgenerally there
are some agreed proxies of SC. For example, following Putnam
(2000)mainmeasures of SC centre around proxies of trust and lev-
els of engagement or interaction in social or group activities.When
trying to measure SC we should keep in mind particular aspects
(OECD, 2001a):
• we should pay attention to causal connections since sources,
functions and outcomes may be confused;
• SC is mainly characterized by tacit and relational aspects which
are naturally difficult to observe, to measure and to codify;
• usual variables of SC (trust, membership, voting, etc.) provide
proxy measures and should not be confused with the underlying
concept.
According to the vast majority of the literature on SC (Paxton,
1999; Costa and Kahn, 2003; Van and Schaik, 2002), I observe the
beliefs component through several reports of confidence in insti-
tutions, namely armed forces, police, parliament, civil services,
press, ecclesiastic, judicial system, education system, labour unions
and major companies. Answers to these questions range on a 1 to
4 point scale going from none at all to a great deal. To measure
11 Putnam (1993), p. 56.
12 See Bartolini et al. (2008), p. 5.
13 See Bartolini et al. (2008), pp. 5–6
14 Please refer to Table A.1 in Appendix A for a summarizing scheme.
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non-market relations, I use trust in individuals (represented by a
dummy variable), membership and unpaid voluntary work in var-
ious groups and organizations. Given the multiple nature of the
last two proxies, I adopt thementioned distinction between intrin-
sically and extrinsically motivated group participation (Bartolini
et al., 2008). Groups and organizations entering the first set are
labelled Putnam’s groups while those comprised in the second one
are named Olson’s group (Knack, 2003). This distinction is based
on theworks of the two authors: Olson (1982) emphasizes the ten-
dency of associations to act as lobbies to get policies that protect
the interest of special groups at the expenses of the society as a
whole. Consequently, I include in Olson’s groups all those groups
and organizations which are extrinsically motivated since it is sup-
posed they are experienced only for instrumental reasons. On the
contrary, Putnam (1993) identifies in associations a source of gen-
eral trust and of social ties leading to governmental and economic
efficiency (Bartolini et al., 2008). In thispaperputnamiangroupsare
interpreted as intrinsic SC supposing they are experienced only for
the pleasure of being a member. Among Putnam’s group I include
social welfare service for elderly, church organizations, sport clubs,
art and literature clubs, fraternal groups and youth associations,
human and animal rights, peace movements and environmental
groups. Among Olson’s groups I include fraternity associations,
unions, professional organizations and farm organizations, organi-
zation concerned with health and consumer groups. Finally, there
are some groups that were left unclassified and labeled as other
groups because it is not clear whether they constitute intrinsic or
extrinsic RSC, although they are part of RSC. In this latter group I
included veterans associations, political parties and “other groups.”
Each option between these three groups of variables is expressed
as a dummy variable.
Finally, SWB is proxied by the variable happiness that is mea-
sured on a scale ranging from 1 to 4 and is based on answers to
the following question: “All considered you would say that you are:
1. very happy; 2. pretty happy; 3. not too happy; 4. not at all happy?”.
In order to study SC and SWB trends during the last 20
years for each of the considered European countries, I follow two
approaches15: I first regress the proxies of SC and SWB on time
dummy variables. In this way trends are based on mean values;
than I regress the same proxies on different groups of control vari-
ables (age, gender, familiar status and education) to checkwhether
such trendsdependonpeculiar individual andsocial aspects. Inpar-
ticular, age is considered linearly and with its square; a dummy on
male is introduced; familiar status is controlled through threeprox-
ies: the number of children, a variable ranging between zero and
twenty, and two dummy variables for single and married; finally,
education includes a dummy for illiterate.
This model is repeated for each considered country. Formally, I
estimate the following:
Proxyj
it
= ˛ + ˇ1 · Di,w2 + ˇ2 · Di,w3 + ˇ3 · Di,w4 + 1 · Ageit
+2 · Age2it + 3 · Malei + 1 · NChildit + 2 · Singleit
+3 · Marriedit + ı1 · Illiterateit
(1)
where index j stands for the different proxies of SC and SWB, index t
represents the variouswaves and index i stands for each individual.
In each equation three dummy variables have been introduced to
account for the four waves. Where possible I kept the first wave
as the reference period. When information about the first waves
where not available, I adopted the secondwave as reference period.
Since I have different indicators of SC and one proxy of SWB,
my regressionmethodology varies following the specifities of each
depending variable: in the case of generalized trust, participa-
15 See Aguiar and Hurst (2006).
tion in voluntary organizations and unpaid voluntary work, that
are expressed in the form of dummies, I adopted a logit model;
when studying confidence in institutions or happiness, which are
ordered variables, I used an ordered logitmodel. Tables A.2–A.12 in
Appendix A report summary statistics for each considered country.
When dealing with these data we have to be careful because,
although theWVS is themost complete database onour topic, it has
somedeficiencies. Inparticular,wehave tokeep inmind that obser-
vations about Italy, Ireland, Denmark, France, The Netherlands and
Belgiumaremissing in the thirdwave; similarly, data about Finland
are not collected in the first wave, while Norway is not observed
in the fourth wave. Finally, the third wave does not contain infor-
mation about trust in the United Kingdom and about confidence in
the educational system in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Germany.
Overall, the pooled dataset contains 48,340 observations.
3. Results
3.1. Social capital trends in western Europe
I report and discuss results from several regressions relative to
Eq. (1). Results about each regression are reported in Appendix A
in Tables A.13–A.23. Here I discuss directly my conclusive results
which are summarized in charts in Appendix B.
A first interesting aspect emerging from my regressions is that
SC trend in considered European countries is mainly positive.
Hence, thepicture aboutwesternEuropeappears different fromthe
American one. There is only one country that seems more similar
to USA, the Great Britain. In this case themajority of the considered
proxies of SC is declining meaning that during last 20 years Great
Britain experienced an erosion of SC. Charts from Figs. B.1 to B.7
show this result. On the x-axis I report the time from 1980 to 2000.
Each point on the x-axis corresponds to a wave in the WVS. On the
y-axis I report coefficients of the time dummies originating from
regressions. The point on the x-axis corresponding to zero repre-
sents the reference year, while other points in the charts defining
trends corresponds to the coefficients of the time dummies. Finally,
each chart reports more than one line. Each line represents results
from regressionswith different sets of control variables, coherently
with the adopted model. Charts suggest that in Great Britain SC,
and in particular membership in groups or organizations and trust
in others, decreases strongly during all the considered period. Sim-
ilarly, every proxy of beliefs in institutions declines steadily all along
the last 20 years. This picture changes ifwe turn considering unpaid
voluntary work. Figs. B.1(c) and B.2(c) and (d) suggest that all these
proxies have been increasing during last 20 years in stark contrast
with the other proxies of relational SC.
Overall, the evolution in time of British SC seems to be sim-
ilar to the American one for what concern trust, membership in
groups and associations and trust in others,while amore optimistic
conclusions may be drawn considering unpaid voluntary work.
The picture is completely different if we consider remaining
countries. First of all, the strong contradiction between mem-
bership and unpaid voluntary work observed for Great Britain
disappears: looking at charts from Figs. B.8(c) to B.14(c)we observe
that in all these cases the trends of the two proxies are concordant.
Secondly, trends about relational goods are generally positive. Here
I will discuss only results for some of the major countries of the
sample. Considering membership in Putnam’s groups, charts from
Figs. B.8(a) to B.10(a) suggest that Italy, the Netherlands and Swe-
den from 1980 to 2000 experienced a growing trend. Figs. B.11(a)
and B.12(a) show that the same trend is positive also in France and
in Denmark, even if in these two cases relative growth rate reduces
since 1990. Considering Norway, Fig. B.13(a) suggests a positive
trend, but in this case available data do not allow to set a clear
Author's personal copy
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pattern. I can only conclude that in this case the trend between
1980 and 1990 is positive. Finally, the chart about Germany16
(Fig. B.14(a)) points out that overall from 1980 to 2000 member-
ship in Putnam’s groups is positive, but I have to remark that the
trend reverted since 1990.
Considering the other component of relational goods, that is to
say trust in others, the picture emerging from regressions is more
homogeneous, since it grows up in every of the mentioned coun-
tries. I have only to highlight two cases: (1) Italy, in which the
overall trend is positive although the growth rate of trust in other’s
slightly reduces starting from 1990; (2) France, which emerges as
the only Continental European country, among the investigated
ones, with a decreasing trend of trust in others during last 20 years
(please, consider (b) charts from Figs. B.8 to B.14.
Let’s turn now to the second component of SC: beliefs in insti-
tutions. In this case trends are more mixed among both variables
and countries. In any case, some general trends arise quite clearly
indicating a worrying trend for confidence in some institutions:
in particular, it seems that during last 20 years European citizens
have persistently lost confidence in the judicial system, in religious
institutions, in armed forces and in police.
Overall, we can state that, although some specificities and a
mixed pattern regarding confidence in institutions, results suggest
that the evolution of SC during time in the considered European
countries is different from the American one. In this framework,
the experience of Great Britain appears as peculiar and, at least
regarding the majority of the considered proxies, more similar to
the American one.
3.2. Social capital and subjective well-being in western Europe
Previous results conveyed a framework in which western Euro-
pean countries appear as very different from the USA. For quite
every considered country, relational SC increased from 1980 to
2000. Regressions about the trend of SWB in the same countries
confirm a similar pattern. In fact, SWB increases in every consid-
ered country with the exception of Great Britain in which SWB is
strongly decreasing between 1980 and 1995. Unfortunately, data
about the fourthwave are not available in this case (see Figs. B.15 to
B.19 in Appendix B). Charts about remaining considered European
countries show an overall positive pattern, even if single trends
may differ. For example, France, Norway, Denmark and Nether-
lands have a steady growing trend (see Figs. B.17(b), B.18(a) and
(b), and B.16(b)); trends for Germany and Italy are positive too, but
the growth rate reduces significantly between 1990 and 2000 (see
Figs. B.16(a) and B.19 in Appendix B); finally, Sweden’s trend has a
U-shaped outline (see Fig. B.17(a)), even if the net result is positive.
4. Conclusions
The aim of present study was to point out trends of social
capital in western European countries finding evidence to sup-
port the thesis that SC trends can help to explain SWB trends.
In this way SC gains a new dimension: it can give further mean-
ing to the widely used term well-being. Whenever present thesis
would be corroborated by further research, SC would acquire a
central role in the definition of our policy agenda. For example,
future economic policies should not only focus onways to promote
economic growth, but should pay attention also to their effects
on SC.
Using different regression techniques, following the nature of
dependent variables, I tried to assess the trends of four proxies of
16 Observations about Germany before 1989 refer to West Germany.
SC for eachcountry in theperiodbetween1980and2000. Following
a broadly accepted approach in the literature, I adopted the follow-
ingvariables: trust in individuals,membership ineighteendifferent
voluntary organizations, performing unpaid voluntary work in 18
organizations and confidence in ten institutions. Results are quite
innovative for at least two reasons: (1) contemporary literature
largely focused on trends in USA rather than in European coun-
tries. This is mainly due to the fact that USA have large databases
allowing such studies for longer periods of time (for example the
U.S. GSS); (2) following the debate on the Easterlin paradox, my
results suggest thatwe cannot discard thehypothesis that the trend
of SC is important for the trend of SWB. From this point of view,
it is important to stress that I am not performing a causal analy-
sis, but I am simply assessing SC and SWB trends and notice that
in 10 out of 11 countries signs of SC trends are concordant with
signs of SWB trends. Such finding implies also that the theoretical
predictions of the NEG model are largely met confirming the rel-
evance of the model as explanatory tool. Moreover, whether such
evidence would be substantiated by future research, we could say
thatUSAdonot represent a “puzzlingoutlier” since “incomegrowth
is desirable as far as it is not associated with a deterioration of
SC.”17 Nonetheless, the question about whether SC trend can help
to explain SWB trend is still an open question asking for further and
deeper research.
Summarizing, my findings are the following:
1. Trends for SC in the analysed European countries are mainly
positive (in particular for relational goods).
2. Although the trends of membership and unpaid voluntary work
in Great Britain are contrasting, still this country appears as an
exception in the European landscape with declining trends for
the majority of the SC proxies.
3. All the considered countries seem affected by a general crisis of
some particular institutions.
4. Given the concordance between SC and SWB trends in 10 out
of 11 cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis that SC can help to
explain SWB.
Concluding,present researchallows to remarka fewaspects: the
first one is that themajority of thewestern European countries and
USA are not exactly following the same pattern.While both regions
have experienced an institutional crisis during last 20 years, rela-
tional social capital and subjective well-being in western Europe
increased. Nonetheless, we should take in mind that these figures
need further investigation to extend both the number of observed
countries and the length of the considered period. By now, present
results suggesting a quite different pattern between USA and the
western European sample push future research in two main direc-
tions: (1) to enlarge present research to discover trends relative
to other countries; (2) to investigate the causes of such a different
performance. Which forces have pushed toward an increasing ero-
sion of social capital in USA? Is European social capital subjected
to the same erosive forces? (3) Do SC trends explain SWB trends in
Europe?
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Appendix A.
Tables A.1–A.23
Table A.1
Summarizing scheme of the different constituents of social capital.
Table A.2
Descriptive statistics about Italy.
Italy Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Happiness 1324 2.879 0.632 1 4 1971 2.990 0.602 1 4 0 1975 2.952 0.693 1 4
Trust in others 1302 0.268 0.443 0 1 1932 0.353 0.478 0 1 0 1946 0.326 0.469 0 1
Putnam’s group 1348 0.127 0.333 0 1 2018 0.246 0.431 0 1 0 2000 0.314 0.464 0 1
Olson’s group 1348 0.103 0.304 0 1 2018 0.123 0.328 0 1 0 2000 0.171 0.377 0 1
Other groups 1348 0.084 0.277 0 1 2018 0.108 0.310 0 1 0 2000 0.108 0.310 0 1
Unpaid work in putnamian groups 1348 0.103 0.304 0 1 2018 0.184 0.388 0 1 0 2000 0.212 0.408 0 1
Unpaid work in olsonian groups 1348 0.062 0.240 0 1 2018 0.065 0.247 0 1 0 2000 0.074 0.262 0 1
Unpaid work in other groups 1348 0.045 0.206 0 1 2018 0.060 0.237 0 1 0 2000 0.054 0.226 0 1
Confidence in
Church 1348 2.628 1.065 1 4 2016 2.724 0.991 1 4 0 1975 2.870 0.891 1 4
Armed forces 1348 2.542 0.954 1 4 2012 2.352 0.859 1 4 0 1948 2.524 0.825 1 4
Educational system 1348 2.568 0.872 1 4 2017 2.453 0.813 1 4 0 1966 2.596 0.816 1 4
Press 1348 2.131 0.814 1 4 2013 2.281 0.778 1 4 0 1954 2.271 0.754 1 4
Labour Unions 1348 2.020 0.858 1 4 2009 2.156 0.809 1 4 0 1927 2.090 0.804 1 4
Police 1348 2.708 0.879 1 4 2012 2.701 0.746 1 4 0 1968 2.767 0.748 1 4
Parliament 1348 2.082 0.847 1 4 2011 2.122 0.803 1 4 0 1944 2.222 0.780 1 4
Civil Services 1348 2.022 0.827 1 4 2013 2.002 0.801 1 4 0 1944 2.216 0.738 1 4
Major Companies 1348 2.073 0.880 1 4 2005 2.631 0.807 1 4 0 1879 2.444 0.779 1 4
Judicial system 1348 2.372 0.880 1 4 2012 2.153 0.821 1 4 0 1946 2.184 0.808 1 4
Age 1348 39.553 16.872 17 86 2018 41.353 16.094 18 88 0 2000 45.284 16.888 18 92
Age2 1348 1848.942 1478.435 289 7396 2018 1968.936 1455.248 324 7744 0 2000 2335.641 1617.433 324 8464
Male 1348 0.493 0.500 0 1 2018 0.478 0.500 0 1 0 2000 0.480 0.500 0 1
No. of children 766 2.275 1.311 1 8 1983 1.317 1.337 0 6 0 1850 1.402 1.330 0 9
Single 1348 0.355 0.479 0 1 2018 0.315 0.464 0 1 0 2000 0.309 0.462 0 1
Married 1348 0.564 0.496 0 1 2018 0.581 0.493 0 1 0 2000 0.584 0.493 0 1
Illiterate 1348 0 0 0 0 2018 0 0 0 0 0 2000 0.065 0.247 0 1
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Table A.13
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Italy.
Italy
Putnam’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
W2 0.808 [0.000]*** 0.841 [0.000]*** 0.619 [0.000]*** 0.623 [0.000]***
w4 1.145 [0.000]*** 1.233 [0.000]*** 1.015 [0.000]*** 1.035 [0.000]***
Age −0.00892 [0.438] 0.0344 [0.022]** 0.0320 [0.035]**
Age2 −0.0000507 [0.690] −0.000414 [0.008]*** −0.000381 [0.016]**
Male 0.203 [0.002]*** 0.245 [0.001]*** 0.241 [0.001]***
No. of children −0.0746 [0.053]* −0.0715 [0.065]*
Single 0.482 [0.003]*** 0.474 [0.003]***
Married −0.122 [0.346] −0.131 [0.313]
Illiterate −0.343 [0.169]
cons −1.929 [0.000]*** −1.605 [0.000]*** −2.501 [0.000]*** −2.462 [0.000]***
No. of observations 5366 5366 4599 4599
Pseudo R2 0.0278 0.0373 0.0456 0.0460
chi2 145.8 183.6 215.1 218.2
Olson’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.198 [0.078]* 0.149 [0.187] −0.0145 [0.912] −0.0106 [0.935]
w4 0.585 [0.000]*** 0.553 [0.000]*** 0.393 [0.002]*** 0.414 [0.002]***
Age 0.150 [0.000]*** 0.135 [0.000]*** 0.132 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.00163 [0.000]*** −0.00146 [0.000]*** −0.00142 [0.000]***
Male 0.747 [0.000]*** 0.778 [0.000]*** 0.772 [0.000]***
No. of children −0.143 [0.001]*** −0.139 [0.001]***
Single −0.199 [0.327] −0.207 [0.306]
Married −0.116 [0.447] −0.124 [0.416]
Illiterate −0.464 [0.180]
cons −2.163 [0.000]*** −5.556 [0.000]*** −4.824 [0.000]*** −4.772 [0.000]***
No. of observations 5366 5366 4599 4599
Pseudo R2 0.00842 0.0490 0.0456 0.0461
chi2 35.73 199.6 172.4 174.0
Other groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.275 [0.024]** 0.292 [0.017]** 0.153 [0.330] 0.161 [0.305]
w4 0.280 [0.022]** 0.329 [0.008]*** 0.168 [0.285] 0.206 [0.192]
Age 0.0162 [0.333] 0.0459 [0.040]** 0.0412 [0.066]*
Age2 −0.000280 [0.130] −0.000510 [0.028]** −0.000447 [0.055]*
Male 0.666 [0.000]*** 0.597 [0.000]*** 0.590 [0.000]***
No. of children −0.104 [0.038]** −0.0988 [0.051]*
Single 0.275 [0.251] 0.260 [0.278]
Married 0.0384 [0.837] 0.0248 [0.894]
Illiterate −0.977 [0.059]*
cons −2.391 [0.000]*** −2.896 [0.000]*** −3.485 [0.000]*** −3.407 [0.000]***
No. of observations 5366 5366 4599 4599
Pseudo R2 0.00186 0.0205 0.0217 0.0232
chi2 6.296 86.36 80.05 81.06
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.399 [0.000]*** 0.397 [0.000]*** 0.411 [0.000]*** 0.414 [0.000]***
w4 0.280 [0.000]*** 0.306 [0.000]*** 0.299 [0.004]*** 0.317 [0.002]***
Age 0.0272 [0.014]** 0.0662 [0.000]*** 0.0642 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.000376 [0.002]*** −0.000709 [0.000]*** −0.000683 [0.000]***
Male 0.0569 [0.342] 0.0390 [0.552] 0.0360 [0.582]
No. of children −0.0592 [0.076]* −0.0568 [0.090]*
Single 0.300 [0.039]** 0.293 [0.044]**
Married −0.00613 [0.958] −0.0132 [0.909]
Illiterate −0.298 [0.203]
cons −1.005 [0.000]*** −1.418 [0.000]*** −2.401 [0.000]*** −2.368 [0.000]***
No. of observations 5180 5180 4441 4441
Pseudo R2 0.00407 0.00783 0.0122 0.0125
chi2 25.90 49.19 62.12 62.28
Unpaid putnamian work Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.53 [0.000]*** 0.533 [0.000]*** 0.395 [0.009]*** 0.4 [0.008]***
w4 0.77 [0.000]*** 0.779 [0.000]*** 0.635 [0.000]*** 0.661 [0.000]***
Age −0.00266 [0.848] 0.0305 [0.101] 0.0284 [0.129]
Age2 −0.0001 [0.519] −0.000364 [0.064]* −0.000335 [0.091]*
Male 0.231 [0.003]*** 0.255 [0.002]*** 0.251 [0.003]***
No. of children −0.0632 [0.148] −0.0602 [0.171]
Single 0.478 [0.014]** 0.47 [0.016]**
Married −0.0377 [0.810] −0.045 [0.775]
Illiterate −0.445 [0.142]
cons −2.086 [0.000]*** −1.868 [0.000]*** −2.651 [0.000]*** −2.621 [0.000]***
No. of observations 5366 5366 4599 4599
Pseudo R2 0.0123 0.021 0.0291 0.0297
chi2 46.1 62.11 94.2 98.5
Author's personal copy
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Table A.13 (Continued )
Happiness Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.356 [0.000]*** 0.380 [0.000]*** 0.327 [0.000]*** 0.330 [0.000]***
w4 0.258 [0.001]*** 0.346 [0.000]*** 0.290 [0.001]*** 0.307 [0.001]***
Age 0.0205 [0.042]*** −0.0506 [0.000]*** −0.0523 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.000401 [0.000]*** 0.000316 [0.024]** 0.000338 [0.017]**
Male 0.203 [0.000]*** 0.174 [0.006]*** 0.172 [0.007]***
No. of children −0.0441 [0.182] −0.0421 [0.201]
Single 0.337 [0.021]** 0.330 [0.023]**
Married 1.226 [0.000]*** 1.220 [0.000]***
Illiterate −0.238 [0.292]
cutl −3.310 [0.000]*** −3.182 [0.000]*** −4.118 [0.000]*** −4.146 [0.000]***
cut2 −1.298 [0.000]*** −1.148 [0.000]*** −2.039 [0.000]*** −2.067 [0.000]***
cut3 1.927 [0.000]*** 2.133 [0.000]*** 1.355 [0.000]*** 1.328 [0.000]***
No. of observations 5270 4519 4519
Pseudo R2 0.00244 0.380 0.0338 0.0340
chi2 26.85 271.9 272.2
p-values in brackets: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table A.14
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Great Britain.
United Kingdom
Putnam’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.224 [0.007]*** 0.185 [0.029]** 0.159 [0.117] 0.159 [0.117]
w4 −0.669 [0.000]*** −0.776 [0.000]*** −0.786 [0.000]*** −0.786 [0.000]***
Age 0.0239 [0.035]** 0.0507 [0.001]*** 0.0507 [0.001]***
Age2 −0.000201 [0.081]* −0.000443 [0.002]*** −0.000443 [0.002]***
Male −0.203 [0.006]*** −0.135 [0.096]* −0.135 [0.096]*
No. of children −0.141 [0.000]*** −0.141 [0.000]***
Single 0.239 [0.119] 0.239 [0.119]
Married 0.101 [0.339] 0.101 [0.339]
Illiterate
cons −0.736 [0.000]*** −1.207 [0.000]*** −1.716 [0.000]*** −1.716 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3651 3613 3105 3105
Pseudo R2 0.0208 0.0272 0.0354 0.0354
chi2 87.18 108.1 129.2 129.2
Olson’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 −0.0873 [0.326] −0.163 [0.075]* −0.0588 [0.590] −0.0588 [0.590]
w4 −0.888 [0.000]*** −1.003 [0.000]*** −0.864 [0.000]*** −0.864 [0.000]***
Age 0.121 [0.000]*** 0.159 [0.000]*** 0.159 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.00134 [0.000]*** −0.00166 [0.000]*** −0.00166 [0.000]***
Male 0.749 [0.000]*** 0.839 [0.000]*** 0.839 [0.000]***
No. of children −0.132 [0.000]*** −0.132 [0.000]***
Single 0.224 [0.251] 0.224 [0.251]
Married 0.164 [0.200] 0.164 [0.200]
Illiterate
cons −0.986 [0.000]*** −3.593 [0.000]*** −4.663 [0.000]*** −4.663 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3651 3613 3105 3105
Pseudo R2 0.0194 0.0658 0.0802 0.0802
chi2 67.43 186.1 196.2 196.2
Other groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.504 [0.000]*** 0.460 [0.000]*** 0.589 [0.000]*** 0.589 [0.000]***
w4 0.0613 [0.644] −0.0314 [0.817] 0.145 [0.375] 0.145 [0.375]
Age 0.0595 [0.000]*** 0.0811 [0.000]*** 0.0811 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.000636 [0.000]*** −0.000816 [0.000]*** −0.000816 [0.000]***
Male −0.00826 [0.931] −0.111 [0.290] −0.111 [0.290]
No. of children −0.0712 [0.060]* −0.0712 [0.060]*
Single −0.0736 [0.717] −0.0736 [0.717]
Married 0.227 [0.104] 0.227 [0.104]
Illiterate
cons −2.026 [0.000]*** −3.163 [0.000]*** −3.821 [0.000]*** −3.821 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3651 3613 3105 3105
Pseudo R2 0.00843 0.0149 0.0220 0.0220
chi2 25.39 41.24 53.22 53.22
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.0227 [0.777] −0.0367 [0.655] −0.0405 [0.678] −0.0434 [0.657]
w3 −0.588 [0.000]*** −0.642 [0.000]*** −0.743 [0.000]*** −0.596 [0.000]***
W4 −0.626 [0.000]*** −0.660 [0.000]*** −0.646 [0.000]*** −0.644 [0.000]***
Age 0.0442 [0.000]*** 0.0610 [0.000]*** 0.0617 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.000409 [0.000]*** −0.000556 [0.000]*** −0.000549 [0.000]***
Male 0.265 [0.000]*** 0.275 [0.000]*** 0.267 [0.000]***
Author's personal copy
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Table A.14 (Continued )
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
No. of children −0.0820 [0.002]*** −0.0895 [0.001]***
Single 0.165 [0.191] 0.155 [0.219]
Married 0.0949 [0.279] 0.0920 [0.294]
Illiterate −0.538 [0.001]***
cons −0.277 [0.000]*** −1.376 [0.000]*** −1.729 [0.000]*** −1.755 [0.000]***
No. of observations 4600 4563 4076 4076
Pseudo R2 0.0163 0.0233 0.0281 0.0304
chi2 96.70 136.8 147.3 156.3
Unpaid putnamian work Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.295 [0.015]** 0.286 [0.019]** 0.254 [0.068]* 0.254 [0.068]*
w4 1.06 [0.000]*** 1.063 [0.000]*** 1.083 [0.000]*** 1.083 [0.000]***
Age 0.0823 [0.000]*** 0.0966 [0.000]*** 0.0966 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.00075 [0.000]*** −0.000872 [0.000]*** −0.000872 [0.000]***
Male −0.255 [0.008]*** −0.228 [0.025]** −0.228 [0.025]**
No. of children −0.12 [0.002]*** −0.12 [0.002]***
Single 0.179 [0.345] 0.179 [0.345]
Married 0.243 [0.079]* 0.243 [0.079]*
Illiterate
cons −1.844 [0.000]*** −3.678 [0.000]*** −4.009 [0.000]*** −4.009 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3651 3613 3105 3105
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.0448 0.0442 0.0442
chi2 90.62 134.1 116.5 116.5
Happiness Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 −0.206 [0.006]*** −0.232 [0.002]*** −0.182 [0.048]** −0.183 [0.048]**
w3 −0.297 [0.000]*** −0.320 [0.000]*** −0.313 [0.003]*** −0.272 [0.015]**
Age 0.0149 [0.111] −0.0237 [0.052]* −0.0236 [0.054]*
Age2 −0.000132 [0.167] 0.000258 [0.030]** 0.000261 [0.028]**
Male −0.0612 [0.348] −0.0874 [0.225] −0.0896 [0.213]
No. of children −0.0782 [0.008]*** −0.0810 [0.006]***
Single 0.0349 [0.806] 0.0286 [0.841]
Married 0.875 [0.000]*** 0.875 [0.000]***
Illiterate −0.146 [0.304]
cut1 −4.414 [0.000]*** −4.123 [0.000]*** −4.470 [0.000]*** −4.463 [0.000]***
cut2 −2.649 [0.000]*** −2.342 [0.000]*** −2.686 [0.000]*** −2.678 [0.000]***
cut3 0.436 [0.000]*** 0.747 [0.000]*** 0.375 [0.204] 0.383 [0.195]
No. of observations 3728 3224 3224
Pseudo R2 0.00201 −0.232 0.0214 0.0215
chi2 14.58 121.8 121.7
p-values in brackets: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table A.15
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Ireland.
Ireland
Putnam’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
W2 0.0399 [0.648] 0.0174 [0.845] −0.0846 [0.451] −0.0790 [0.481]
W4 0.239 [0.006]*** 0.218 [0.015]** 0.162 [0.148] 0.256 [0.030]**
Age 0.0167 [0.141] 0.0222 [0.165] 0.0208 [0.192]
Age2 −0.000200 [0.086]* −0.000232 [0.141] −0.000202 [0.200]
Male 0.220 [0.002]*** 0.233 [0.005]*** 0.246 [0.003]***
No. of children 0.00607 [0.803] 0.0113 [0.641]
Single 0.835 [0.000]*** 0.837 [0.000]***
Married 0.398 [0.005]*** 0.395 [0.005]***
Illiterate −0.413 [0.014]**
cons −0.449 [0.000]*** −0.820 [0.001]*** −1.409 [0.000]*** −1.438 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3229 3200 2572 2572
Pseudo R2 0.00194 0.00497 0.0151 0.0168
chi2 8.516 21.04 49.66 56.53
Olson’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.0467 [0.683] 0.0105 [0.928] 0.207 [0.175] 0.211 [0.167]
w4 0.328 [0.003]*** 0.322 [0.004]*** 0.501 [0.001]*** 0.593 [0.000]***
Age 0.0610 [0.000]*** 0.108 [0.000]*** 0.107 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.000824 [0.000]*** −0.00124 [0.000]*** −0.00121 [0.000]***
Male 0.712 [0.000]*** 0.694 [0.000]*** 0.712 [0.000]***
No. of children −0.0220 [0.486] −0.0152 [0.631]
Single 0.281 [0.257] 0.289 [0.245]
Married 0.180 [0.386] 0.173 [0.404]
Illiterate −0.499 [0.029]**
cons −1.632 [0.000]*** −2.853 [0.000]*** −4.317 [0.000]*** −4.367 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3229 3200 2572 2572
Pseudo R2 0.00337 0.0397 0.0482 0.0503
chi2 10.45 115.7 115.6 122.0
Author's personal copy
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Table A.15 (Continued )
Other groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.266 [0.029]** 0.313 [0.010]** 0.463 [0.005]*** 0.466 [0.004]***
w4 0.555 [0.000]*** 0.609 [0.000]*** 0.733 [0.000]*** 0.777 [0.000]***
Age −0.0126 [0.437] 0.0300 [0.177] 0.0293 [0.189]
Age2 0.0000220 [0.896] −0.000387 [0.081]* −0.000370 [0.097]*
Male 0.139 [0.157] 0.0716 [0.523] 0.0790 [0.480]
No. of children 0.0309 [0.322] 0.0338 [0.280]
Single 0.174 [0.455] 0.175 [0.452]
Married 0.0439 [0.815] 0.0410 [0.827]
Illiterate −0.209 [0.323]
cons −1.932 [0.000]*** −1.547 [0.000]*** −2.774 [0.000]*** −2.790 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3229 3200 2572 2572
Pseudo R2 0.00810 0.0133 0.0150 0.0155
chi2 22.86 42.57 37.74 38.90
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.254 [0.004]*** 0.218 [0.014]** 0.131 [0.240] 0.133 [0.230]
w4 0.217 [0.015]** −0.235 [0.010]*** −0.289 [0.010]** −0.244 [0.041]**
Age 0.0213 [0.061]* 0.0376 [0.020]** 0.0369 [0.022]**
Age2 −0.000202 [0.084]* −0.000275 [0.082]* −0.000261 [0.102]
Male 0.233 [0.001]*** 0.140 [0.096]* 0.145 [0.083]*
No. of children −0.00697 [0.776] −0.00456 [0.853]
Single 0.791 [0.000]*** 0.794 [0.000]***
Married 0.598 [0.000]*** 0.598 [0.000]***
Illiterate −0.192 [0.260]
cons −0.359 [0.000]*** −0.922 [0.000]*** −1.938 [0.000]*** −1.952 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3150 3121 2520 2520
Pseudo R2 0.00621 0.00891 0.0176 0.0180
Chi2 26.37 37.92 58.75 59.35
Unpaid putnamian work Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.383 [0.001]*** 0.345 [0.003]*** 0.326 [0.026]** 0.343 [0.019]**
w4 0.538 [0.000]*** 0.491 [0.000]*** 0.516 [0.000]*** 0.727 [0.000]***
Age 0.0572 [0.000]*** 0.0414 [0.047]** 0.0431 [0.040]**
Age2 −0.000616 [0.000]*** −0.00044 [0.034]** −0.000423 [0.043]**
Male 0.0964 [0.300] 0.0772 [0.458] 0.0929 [0.374]
No. of children 0.0275 [0.362] 0.0403 [0.187]
Single 0.818 [0.000]*** 0.827 [0.000]***
Married 0.731 [0.000]*** 0.725 [0.000]***
Illiterate −0.797 [0.000]***
cons −1.733 [0.000]*** 2.888 [0.000]*** −3.327 [0.000]*** −3.494 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3229 3200 2572 2572
Pseudo R2 0.00816 0.0136 0.0172 0.0235
chi2 23.04 41.78 38.01 56.79
Happiness Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.0534 [0.539] 0.0818 [0.355] −0.0359 [0.744] −0.0376 [0.733]
w4 0.0687 [0.405] 0.0823 [0.335] 0.0359 [0.737] 0.0123 [0.913]
Age 0.00607 [0.584] −0.0590 [0.000]*** −0.0587 [0.000]****
Age2 −0.000121 [0.290] 0.000551 [0.000]*** 0.000544 [0.000]***
Male −0.311 [0.000]*** −0.342 [0.000]*** −0.345 [0.000]***
No. of children −0.0372 [0.126] −0.0386 [0.116]
Single 0.217 [0.226] 0.219 [0.224]
Married 1.019 [0.000]*** 1.021 [0.000]***
Illiterate 0.102 [0.526]
cut1 −4.795 [0.000]*** −4.939 [0.000]*** −5.892 [0.000]*** −5.898 [0.000]***
cut2 −2.976 [0.000]*** −3.134 [0.000]*** −3.997 [0.000]*** −4.004 [0.000]***
cut3 0.355 [0.000]*** 0.229 [0.331] −0.648 [0.081]* −0.654 [0.079]*
No. of observations 3163 2531 2531
Pseudo R2 0.000137 0.0818 0.0234 0.0235
chi2 0.770 94.58 94.60
p-values in brackets: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Author's personal copy
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Table A.16
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in France.
France
Putnam’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 1.045 [0.000]*** 1.031 [0.000]*** 0.930 [0.000]*** 0.949 [0.000]***
w4 0.990 [0.000]*** 0.966 [0.000]*** 0.862 [0.000]*** 0.998 [0.000]***
Age 0.0450 [0.000]*** 0.0400 [0.007]*** 0.0373 [0.012]**
Age2 −0.000505 [0.000]*** −0.000458 [0.002]*** −0.000394 [0.008]***
Male 0.133 [0.082]* 0.145 [0.074]* 0.143 [0.079]*
No. of children −0.0205 [0.509] −0.00766 [0.807]
Single 0.153 [0.277] 0.146 [0.301]
Married 0.0848 [0.431] 0.0900 [0.405]
Illiterate −0.793 [0.000]***
cons −1.872 [0.000]*** −2.775 [0.000]*** −2.614 [0.000]*** −2.670 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3817 3817 3383 3383
Pseudo R2 0.0305 0.0347 0.0249 0.0308
chi2 113.6 132.9 86.27 107.7
Olson’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.0442 [0.735] −0.0706 [0.596] −0.0941 [0.518] −0.0878 [0.547]
w4 −0.141 [0.240] −0.337 [0.006]*** −0.354 [0.012]** −0.279 [0.059]*
Age 0.198 [0.000]*** 0.192 [0.000]*** 0.191 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.00202 [0.000]*** −0.00195 [0.000]*** −0.00192 [0.000]***
Male 0.788 [0.000]*** 0.753 [0.000]*** 0.753 [0.000]***
No. of children −0.0921 [0.026]** −0.0880 [0.034]**
Single −0.0325 [0.887] −0.0418 [0.854]
Married 0.355 [0.026]** 0.362 [0.024]**
Illiterate −0.409 [0.098]*
cons −1.992 [0.000]*** −6.586 [0.000]*** −6.526 [0.000]*** −6.549 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3817 3817 3383 3383
Pseudo R2 0.000936 0.0578 0.0606 0.0618
chi2 2.537 141.5 141.7 141.4
Other groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.340 [0.021]** 0.313 [0.033]** 0.571 [0.001]*** 0.588 [0.001]***
w4 0.371 [0.005]*** 0.322 [0.016]** 0.573 [0.001]*** 0.708 [0.000]***
Age 0.0589 [0.002]*** 0.0707 [0.002]*** 0.0679 [0.003]***
Age2 −0.000635 [0.001]*** −0.000714 [0.002]*** −0.000652 [0.004]***
Male 0.345 [0.002]*** 0.258 [0.033]** 0.256 [0.035]**
No. of children 0.0301 [0.491] 0.0419 [0.343]
Single 0.419 [0.059]* 0.410 [0.065]*
Married 0.418 [0.014]** 0.424 [0.012]**
Illiterate −0.800 [0.003]***
cons −2.454 [0.000]*** −3.785 [0.000]*** −4.737 [0.000]*** −4.793 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3817 3817 3383 3383
Pseudo R2 0.00358 0.0117 0.0183 0.0232
chi2 8.487 30.29 40.38 49.42
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 −0.111 [0.288] −0.111 [0.288] −0.0994 [0.420] −0.0737 [0.549]
w4 −0.195 [0.036]** −0.190 [0.044]** −0.228 [0.048]** −0.0588 [0.622]
Age 0.0209 [0.127] 0.0569 [0.001]*** 0.0538 [0.002]***
Age2 −0.000280 [0.055]* −0.00057] [0.002]*** −0.000499 [0.005]***
Male 0.0665 [0.403] −0.0282 [0.749] −0.0341 [0.699]
No. of children −0.0728 [0.039]** −0.0599 [0.094]*
Single 0.444 [0.004]*** 0.429 [0.005]***
Married 0.00317 [0.979] 0.0112 [0.926]
Illiterate −1.083 [0.000]***
cons −1.109 [0.000]*** −1.443 [0.000]*** −2.310 [0.000]*** −2.371 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3616 3616 3218 3218
Pseudo R2 0.00113 0.00359 0.00880 0.0174
chi2 4.402 12.40 27.56 48.57
Unpaid putnamian work Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.758 [0.000]*** 0.755 [0.000]*** 0.816 [0.000]*** 0.839 [0.000]***
w4 0.834 [0.000]*** 0.802 [0.000]*** 0.899 [0.000]*** 1.031 [0.000]***
Age 0.0859 [0.000]*** 0.0712 [0.000]*** 0.0692 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.000834 [0.000]*** −0.000701 [0.000]*** −0.00065 [0.001]***
Male 0.0849 [0.358] 0.093 [0.338] 0.0912 [0.348]
No. of children 0.00644 [0.851] 0.0175 [0.614]
Single 0.221 [0.215] 0.215 [0.226]
Married 0.385 [0.004]*** 0.395 [0.003]***
Illiterate −0.656 [0.001]***
cons −2.263 [0.000]*** −4.23 [0.000]*** −4.229 [0.000]*** −4.301 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3817 3817 3383 3383
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.0282 0.0255 0.0297
chi2 48 88.31 77.03 90.04
Author's personal copy
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Table A.16 (Continued )
Happiness Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.193 [0.025]** 0.224 [0.010]*** 0.302 [0.002]*** 0.309 [0.002]***
w4 0.502 [0.000]*** 0.564 [0.000]*** 0.701 [0.000]*** 0.746 [0.000]***
Age −0.0101 [0.335] −0.0737 [0.000]*** −0.0743 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.0000212 [0.846] 0.000581 [0.000]*** 0.000597 [0.000]***
Male −0.0537 [0.424] −0.0824 [0.256] −0.0837 [0.249]
No. of children 0.0300 [0.310] 0.0334 [0.258]
Single 0.351 [0.012]** 0.347 [0.013]**
Married 1.069 [0.000]*** 1.072 [0.000]***
Illiterate −0.220 [0.132]
cut1 −4.350 [0.000]*** −4.841 [0.000]*** −5.533 [0.000]*** −5.514 [0.000]***
cut2 −2.186 [0.000]*** −2.674 [0.000]*** −3.351 [0.000]*** −3.332 [0.000]***
cut3 1.266 [0.000]*** 0.807 [0.000]*** 0.200 [0.503] 0.220 [0.460]
No. of observations 3781 3358 3358
Pseudo R2 0.00632 0.224 0.0349 0.0353
chi2 40.84 187.2 189.0
p-values in brackets: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table A.17
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Germany.
Germany
Putnam’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 1.098 [0.000]*** 1.100 [0.000]*** 0.948 [0.000]*** 0.948 [0.000]***
w4 0.522 [0.000]*** 0.535 [0.000]*** 0.366 [0.000]*** 0.369 [0.000]***
Age 0.0227 [0.005]*** 0.0184 [0.063]* 0.0183 [0.065]*
Age2 −0.000258 [0.002]*** −0.000215 [0.027]** −0.000214 [0.028]**
Male 0.176 [0.001]*** 0.179 [0.001]*** 0.179 [0.001]***
No. of children 0.0462 [0.063]* 0.0465 [0.062]*
Single 0.398 [0.000]*** 0.397 [0.000]***
Married 0.144 [0.038]** 0.143 [0.040]**
Illiterate −0.153 [0.663]
cons −1.031 [0.000]*** −1.534 [0.000]*** −1.516 [0.000]*** −1.514 [0.000]***
No. of observations 6778 6775 6230 6230
Pseudo R2 0.0309 0.0336 0.0271 0.0271
chi2 271.2 290.5 218.7 218.7
Olson’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.831 [0.000]*** 0.848 [0.000]*** 0.886 [0.000]*** 0.886 [0.000]***
w4 −0.673 [0.000]*** −0.677 [0.000]*** −0.610 [0.000]*** −0.593 [0.000]***
Age 0.109 [0.000]*** 0.0755 [0.000]*** 0.0754 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.00120 [0.000]*** −0.000889 [0.000]*** −0.000889 [0.000]***
Male 0.747 [0.000]*** 0.742 [0.000]*** 0.743 [0.000]***
No. of children 0.000739 [0.979] 0.00188 [0.947]
Single −0.248 [0.041]** −0.252 [0.039]**
Married 0.185 [0.023]** 0.181 [0.026]**
Illiterate −1.705 [0.097]*
cons −1.240 [0.000]*** −3.761 [0.000]*** −3.060 [0.000]*** −3.057 [0.000]***
No. of observations 6778 6775 6230 6230
Pseudo R2 0.0637 0.105 0.109 0.109
chi2 451.8 728.4 689.3 685.4
Other groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.794 [0.000]*** 0.797 [0.000]*** 1.342 [0.000]*** 1.342 [0.000]***
w4 −0.111 [0.307] −0.0946 [0.376] 0.416 [0.005]*** 0.409 [0.006]***
Age 0.00730 [0.483] 0.0306 [0.018]** 0.0308 [0.018]**
Age2 −0.0000934 [0.383] −0.000303 [0.018]** −0.000305 [0.018]**
Male 0.192 [0.003]*** 0.0848 [0.217] 0.0845 [0.219]
No. of children 0.125 [0.000]*** 0.125 [0.000]***
Single 0.403 [0.002]*** 0.405 [0.002]***
Married 0.188 [0.042]** 0.190 [0.040]**
Illiterate 0.337 [0.442]
cons −1.940 [0.000]*** −2.147 [0.000]*** −3.576 [0.000]*** −3.580 [0.000]***
No. of observations 6778 6775 6230 6230
Pseudo R2 0.0276 0.0292 0.0408 0.0409
chi2 166.7 180.2 223.7 223.6
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.0282 [0.711] 0.0571 [0.454] 0.148 [0.128] 0.148 [0.128]
w3 0.0451 [0.576] 0.0606 [0.454] 0.144 [0.153] 0.160 [0.115]
w4 0.231 [0.004]*** 0.290 [0.000]*** 0.359 [0.000]*** 0.368 [0.000]***
Age −0.00253 [0.751] 0.0161 [0.096]* 0.0159 [0.101]
Age2 −0.0000578 [0.484] −0.000205 [0.034]** −0.000200 [0.038]**
Male 0.0801 [0.095]* 0.0469 [0.353] 0.0455 [0.367]
No. of children −0.00283 [0.896] −0.00319 [0.883]
Author's personal copy
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Table A.17 (Continued )
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
Single 0.334 [0.000]*** 0.329 [0.000]***
Married 0.0976 [0.132] 0.0937 [0.148]
Illiterate −0.556 [0.023]**
cons −0.741 [0.000]*** −0.558 [0.002]*** −1.246 [0.000]*** −1.242 [0.000]***
No. of observations 7870 7861 7408 7408
Pseudo R2 0.00139 0.00510 0.00636 0.00695
chi2 14.13 51.16 59.29 64.36
Unpaid putnamian work Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.662 [0.000]*** 0.658 [0.000]*** 0.671 [0.000]*** 0.672 [0.000]***
w4 0.193 [0.100] 0.173 [0.141] 0.157 [0.230] 0.171 [0.192]
Age 0.0479 [0.000]*** 0.0347 [0.007]*** 0.0342 [0.008]***
Age2 −0.000498 [0.000]*** −0.000387 [0.002]*** −0.000381 [0.003]***
Male 0.319 [0.000]*** 0.335 [0.O00]*** 0.337 [0.000]***
No. of children 0.067 [0.046]** 0.0682 [0.042]**
Single 0.179 [0.209] 0.177 [0.215]
Married 0.226 [0.020]** 0.225 [0.020]**
Illiterate −1.122 [0.276]
cons −1.794 [0.000]*** −2.942 [0.000]*** −2.891 [0.000]*** −2.883 [0.000]***
No. of observations 6778 6775 6230 6230
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.0201 0.0216 0.0221
chi2 60.86 101 107.8 108.3
Happiness Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.142 [0.018]** 0.171 [0.004]*** 0.163 [0.034]** 0.164 [0.033]**
W3 0.0576 [0.423] 0.0818 [0.259] 0.122 [0.158] 0.142 [0.102]
w4 0.0565 [0.435] 0.115 [0.115] 0.147 [0.090]* 0.159 [0.067]*
Age −0.0121 [0.106] 0.0726 [0.000]*** −0.0732 [0.000]***
Age2 0.0000524 [0.513] 0.000654 [0.000]*** 0.000663 [0.000]***
Male 0.0340 [0.460] 0.0362 [0.450] −0.0393 [0.413]
No. of children −0.0326 [0.140] −0.0331 [0.134]
Single 0.0526 [0.553] 0.0469 [0.596]
Married 0.938 [0.000]*** 0.935 [0.000]***
Illiterate −0.632 [0.009]***
cut1 −3.876 [0.000]*** −4.258 [0.000]*** −5.160 [0.000]*** −5.173 [0.000]***
cut2 −1.590 [0.000]*** −1.968 [0.000]*** −2.840 [0.000]*** −2.851 [0.000]***
cut3 1.744 [0.000]*** 1.375 [0.000]*** 0.549 [0.015]** 0.541 [0.017]**
No. of observations 8409 8400 7887 7887
Pseudo R2 0.000335 0.00228 0.0216 0.0221
chi2 6.269 36.37 303.3 309.5
p-values in brackets: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table A.18
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Netherlands.
Netherlands
Putnam’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 1.308 [0.000]*** 1.259 [0.000]*** 1.239 [0.000]*** 1.240 [0.000]***
w4 2.088 [0.000]*** 2.003 [0.000]*** 1.986 [0.000]*** 2.005 [0.000]***
Age 0.0572 [0.000]*** 0.0282 [0.133] 0.0256 [0.166]
Age2 −0.000541 [0.000]*** −0.000277 [0.134] −0.000247 [0.172]
Male 0.0390 [0.644] 0.169 [0.082]* 0.164 [0.092]*
No. of children 0.0409 [0.326] 0.0408 [0.328]
Single 0.336 [0.068]* 0.326 [0.077]*
Married 0.490 [0.000]*** 0.490 [0.000]***
Illiterate −1.130 [0.106]
coris −0.0442 [0.440] −1.314 [0.000]*** −1.070 [0.015]** −1.018 [0.020]**
No. of observations 3241 3217 2744 2744
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.123 0.0978 0.0985
chi2 408.3 416.9 274.8 275.8
Olson’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.682 [0.000]*** 0.590 [0.000]*** 0.728 [0.000]*** 0.728 [0.000]***
w4 0.783 [0.000]*** 0.612 [0.000]*** 0.737 [0.000]*** 0.739 [0.000]***
Age 0.130 [0.000]*** 0.121 [0.000]*** 0.121 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.00131 [0.000]*** −0.00118 [0.000]*** −0.00118 [0.000]***
Male 0.569 [0.000]*** 0.542 [0.000]*** 0.541 [0.000]***
No. of children −0.0393 [0.272] −0.0396 [0.268]
Single 0.333 [0.041]** 0.331 [0.042]**
Married 0.468 [0.000]*** 0.468 [0.000]***
Illiterate −0.317 [0.691]
cons −1.078 [0.000]*** −4.091 [0.000]*** −4.377 [0.000]*** −4.369 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3241 3217 2744 2744
Pseudo R2 0.0212 0.0571 0.0525 0.0526
chi2 85.46 221.9 183.7 184.5
Author's personal copy
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Table A.18 (Continued )
Other groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.835 [0.000]*** 0.801 [0.000]*** 0.881 [0.000]*** 0.881 [0.000]***
w4 0.733 [0.000]*** 0.676 [0.000]*** 0.733 [0.000]*** 0.730 [0.000]***
Age 0.00196 [0.889] 0.0271 [0.121] 0.0278 [0.111]
Age2 0.0000656 [0.642] −0.000143 [0.401] −0.000150 [0.374]
Male −0.0123 [0.886] −0.0510 [0.585] −0.0497 [0.595]
No. of children 0.0410 [0.276] 0.0412 [0.274]
Single 0.609 [0.001]*** 0.612 [0.001]***
Married 0.402 [0.003]*** 0.403 [0.003]***
Illiterate 0.268 [0.704]
cons −1.788 [0.000]*** −1.978 [0.000]*** −3.137 [0.000]*** −3.151 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3241 3217 2744 2744
Pseudo R2 0.0214 0.0241 0.0257 0.0257
chi2 68.11 72.77 67.71 67.90
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.349 [0.000]*** 0.417 [0.000]*** 0.401 [0.000]*** 0.401 [0.000]***
W4 0.619 [0.000]*** 0.740 [0.000]*** 0.678 [0.000]*** 0.682 [0.000]***
Age 0.000297 [0.980] 0.0174 [0.272] 0.0166 [0.297]
Age2 −0.000186 [0.133] −0.000319 [0.040]** −0.000310 [0.048]**
Male 0.135 [0.073]* 0.0762 [0.359] 0.0743 [0.371]
No. of children 0.0269 [0.456] 0.0265 [0.462]
Single 0.647 [0.000]*** 0.644 [0.000]***
Married 0.271 [0.017]** 0.271 [0.017]**
Illiterate −0.435 [0.561]
cons −0.210 [0.001]*** 0.0488 [0.852] −0.694 [0.070]* −0.677 [0.079]*
No. of observations 3034 3014 2596 2596
Pseudo R2 0.0117 0.0274 0.0335 0.0336
chi2 48.58 105.6 111.2 111.3
Unpaid putnamian work Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.556 [0.000]*** 0.571 [0.000]*** 0.48 [0.000]*** 0.48 [0.000]***
w4 1.162 [0.000]*** 1.164 [0.000]*** 1.074 [0.000]*** 1.084 [0.000]***
Age 0.0779 [0.000]*** 0.0556 [0.002]*** 0.0537 [0.003]***
Age2 −0.000765 [0.000]*** −0.000551 [0.001]*** −0.000529 [0.003]***
Male 0.0266 [0.752] 0.0345 [0.698] 0.0306 [0.731]
No. of children 0.0504 [0.182] 0.0501 [0.185]
Single 0.479 [0.005]*** 0.471 [0.006]***
Married 0.438 [0.001]*** 0.436 [0.001]***
Illiterate −1.118 [0.163]
cons −1.434 [0.000]*** −3.185 [0.000]*** −3.037 [0.000]*** −3 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3241 3217 2744 2744
Pseudo R2 0.0384 0.0484 0.0376 0.0382
chi2 125.1 183.1 113.3 116.8
Happiness Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.373 [0.000]*** 0.397 [0.000]*** 0.475 [0.000]*** 0.476 [0.000]***
W4 0.391 [0.000]*** 0.445 [0.000]*** 0.600 [0.000]*** 0.607 [0.000]***
Age 0.00717 [0.527] −0.0896 [0.000]*** −0.0916 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.000156 [0.195] 0.000767 [0.000]*** 0.000790 [0.000]***
Male −0.168 [0.017]** −0.118 [0.138] −0.120 [0.130]
No. of children −0.0115 [0.742] −0.0116 [0.741]
Single 0.0568 [0.723] 0.0521 [0.746]
Married 1.157 [0.000]*** 1.158 [0.000]***
Illiterate −0.944 [0.468]
cut1 −4.802 [0.000]*** −4.878 [0.000]*** −6.226 [0.000]*** −6.267 [0.000]***
cut2 −2.811 [0.000]*** −2.892 [0.000]*** −4.282 [0.000]*** −4.322 [0.000]***
cut3 0.582 [0.000]*** 0.515 [0.032]** −0.928 [0.014]** −0.967 [0.012]**
No. of observations 3212 2733 2733
Pseudo R2 0.00513 0.397 0.0410 0.0413
chi2 29.24 173.3 173.8
p-values in brackets: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table A.19
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Belgium.
Belgium
Putnam’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 1.010 [0.000]*** 1.005 [0.000]*** 0.926 [0.000]*** 0.927 [0.000]***
w4 1.166 [0.000]*** 1.181 [0.000]*** 1.096 [0.000]*** 1.110 [0.000]***
Age 0.0149 [0.078]* 0.0190 [0.066]* 0.0184 [0.076]*
Age2 −0.000222 [0.012]** −0.000265 [0.010]*** −0.000256 [0.013]**
Male 0.272 [0.000]*** 0.282 [0.000]*** 0.282 [0.000]***
No. of children 0.0699 [0.002]*** 0.0710 [0.002]***
Single 0.422 [0.000]*** 0.414 [0.000]***
Married 0.119 [0.124] 0.111 [0.151]
Illiterate −0.680 [0.055]*
cons −1.235 [0.000]*** −1.523 [0.000]*** −1.803 [0.000]*** −1.790 [0.000]***
No. of observations 5849 5842 5340 5340
Pseudo R2 0.0288 0.0350 0.0292 0.0298
chi2 203.6 234.8 186.1 189.4
Olson’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.272 [0.002]*** 0.203 [0.021]** 0.240 [0.023]** 0.240 [0.023]**
w4 0.435 [0.000]*** 0.390 [0.000]*** 0.463 [0.000]*** 0.469 [0.000]***
Age 0.0987 [0.000]*** 0.0623 [0.000]*** 0.0619 [0.000]***
ase2 −0.00114 [0.000]*** −0.000804 [0.000]*** −0.000799 [0.000]***
Male 0.622 [0.000]*** 0.661 [0.000]*** 0.661 [0.000]***
No. of children 0.0408 [0.113] 0.0413 [0.109]
Single −0.210 [0.116] −0.214 [0.109]
Married 0.165 [0.072]* 0.161 [0.079]*
Illiterate −0.344 [0.419]
cons −1.419 [0.000]*** −3.502 [0.000]*** 2.832 [0.000]*** −2.825 [0.000]***
No. of observations 5849 5842 5340 5340
Pseudo R2 0.00367 0.0383 0.0397 0.0399
chi2 23.15 203.7 205.1 205.4
Other groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 1.332 [0.000]*** 1.342 [0.000]*** 1.726 [0.000]*** 1.727 [0.000]***
w4 1.542 [0.000]*** 1.551 [0.000]*** 1.908 [0.000]*** 1.919 [0.000]***
Age −0.00634 [0.522] 0.00195 [0.868] 0.00143 [0.903]
Age2 0.0000524 [0.603] −0.0000231 [0.841] −0.0000164 [0.887]
Male −0.138 [0.031]** −0.166 [0.013]** −0.166 [0.013]**
No. of children 0.147 [0.000]*** 0.148 [0.000]***
Single 0.486 [0.000]*** 0.480 [0.000]***
Married 0.164 [0.069]* 0.157 [0.082]*
Illiterate −0.549 [0.188]
cons −2.461 [0.000]*** −2.242 [0.000]*** −3.245 [0.000]*** −3.235 [0.000]***
No. of observations 5849 5842 5340 5340
Pseudo R2 0.0351 0.0360 0.0400 0.0403
chi2 163.4 171.9 155.6 157.5
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.202 [0.013]** 0.202 [0.013]** 0.160 [0.108] 0.161 [0.108]
W4 0.00245 [0.977] 0.0161 [0.853] −0.0469 [0.655] −0.0397 [0.706]
Age 0.00396 [0.673] 0.0115 [0.315] 0.0111 [0.331]
Age2 −0.0000958 [0.326] −0.000147 [0.199] −0.000142 [0.214]
Male 0.157 [0.008]*** 0.140 [0.024]** 0.141 [0.023]**
No. of children 0.0323 [0.176] 0.0327 [0.172]
Single 0.302 [0.010]** 0.297 [0.011]**
Married 0.117 [0.164] 0.113 [0.180]
Illiterate −0.363 [0.370]
cons −0.887 [0.000]*** −0.922 [0.000]*** −1.271 [0.000]*** −1.263 [0.000]***
No. of observations 5401 5395 4958 4958
Pseudo R2 0.00173 0.O0440 0.00489 0.00503
chi2 11.57 29.79 29.89 30.45
Unpaid putnamian work Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.452 [0.000]*** 0.434 [0.000]*** 0.469 [0.000]*** 0.47 [0.000]***
w4 0.685 [0.000]*** 0.676 [0.000]*** 0.683 [0.000]*** 0.688 [0.000]***
Age 0.0336 [0.005]*** 0.0507 [0.001]*** 0.0505 [0.001]***
Age2 −0.000369 [0.003]*** −0.00053 [0.000]*** −0.000527 [0.000]***
Male 0.269 [0.000]*** 0.245 [0.001]*** 0.245 [0.001]***
No. of children 0.0995 [0.001]*** 0.0998 [0.001]***
Single 0.624 [0.000]*** 0.621 [0.000]***
Married 0.129 [0.227] 0.125 [0.239]
Illiterate −0.224 [0.641]
cons −1.704 [0.000]*** −2.481 [0.000]*** −3.261 [0.000]*** −3.257 [0.000]***
No. of observations 5849 5842 5340 5340
Pseudo R2 0.00857 0.0138 0.0181 0.0182
chi2 44.84 69.84 81.55 81.64
Author's personal copy
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Table A.19 (Continued )
Happiness Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.207 [0.002]*** 0.223 [0.001]*** 0.352 [0.000]*** 0.352 [0.000]***
W4 0.231 [0.001]*** 0.266 [0.000]*** 0.403 [0.000]*** 0.395 [0.000]***
Age −0.00815 [0.306] −0.0634 [0.000]*** −0.0630 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.0000125 [0.881] 0.000526 [0.000]*** 0.000520 [0.000]***
Male −0.00316 [0.952] −0.0590 [0.289] −0.0597 [0.284]
No. of children 0.0256 [0.251] 0.0252 [0.260]
Single 0.241 [0.037]** 0.247 [0.033]**
Married 1.064 [0.000]*** 1.069 [0.000]***
Illiterate 0.364 [0.240]
cut1 −4.053 [0.000]*** −4.443 [0.000]*** −4.889 [0.000]*** −4.881 [0.000]***
cut2 −2.358 [0.000]*** −2.744 [0.000]*** −3.213 [0.000]*** −3.205 [0.000]***
cut3 0.615 [0.000]*** 0.242 [0.167] −0.145 [0.566] −0.135 [0.591]
No. of observations 5684 5207 5207
Pseudo R2 0.00105 0.223 0.0302 0.0303
chi2 11.91 268.4 268.6
p-values in brackets: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table A.20
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Denmark.
Denmark
Putnam’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 1.551 [0.000]*** 1.572 [0.000]*** 1.573 [0.000]*** 1.572 [0.000]***
w4 1.703 [0.000]*** 1.735 [0.000]*** 1.772 [0.000]*** 1.774 [0.000]***
Age 0.0341 [0.004]*** 0.0253 [0.094]* 0.0250 [0.098]*
Age2 −0.000470 [0.000]*** −0.000378 [0.010]*** −0.000375 [0.010]**
Male 0.0595 [0.439] 0.0930 [0.254] 0.0906 [0.267]
No. of children −0.101 [0.010]** −0.101 [0.010]**
Single −0.264 [0.065]* −0.261 [0.069]*
Married 0.109 [0.300] 0.109 [0.298]
Illiterate −0.921 [0.459]
cons −1.481 [0.000]*** −1.979 [0.000]*** −1.657 [0.000]*** −1.647 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3235 3235 2812 2812
Pseudo R2 0.0935 0.103 0.0929 0.0931
chi2 352.4 370.9 270.6 271.0
Olson’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.389 [0.000]*** 0.381 [0.000]*** 0.566 [0.000]*** 0.564 [0.000]***
w4 0.455 [0.000]*** 0.446 [0.000]*** 0.708 [0.000]*** 0.712 [0.000]***
Age 0.184 [0.000]*** 0.174 [0.000]*** 0.173 [0.000]***
aBe2 −0.00222 [0.000]*** −0.00211 [0.000]*** −0.00211 [0.000]***
Male 0.548 [0.000]*** 0.520 [0.000]*** 0.515 [0.000]***
No. of children −0.0955 [0.018]** −0.0959 [0.017]**
Single −0.619 [0.000]*** −0.610 [0.000]***
Married −0.0213 [0.849] 0.0206 [0.854]
Illiterate
cons −0.0033 ; [0.954] −3.384 [0.000]*** −3.052 [0.000]*** 3.036 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3235 3235 2812 2809
Pseudo R2 0.0075: i 0.113 0.124 0.123
chi2 33.28 318.2 310.2 309.7
Other groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
W2 0.455 [0.000]*** 0.434 [0.000]*** 0.680 [0.000]*** 0.683 [0.000]***
w4 0.649 [0.000]*** 0.618 [0.000]*** 0.837 [0.000]*** 0.833 [0.000]***
Age 0.0187 [0.168] 0.0420 [0.016]** 0.0432 [0.013]**
Age2 −0.000150 [0.273] −0.000362 [0.029]** 0.000373 [0.024]**
Male 0.116 [0.184] 0.145 [0.121] 0.153 [0.104]
No. of children 0.0834 [0.036]** 0.0836 [0.036]**
Single 0.122 [0.482] 0.110 [0.527]
Married 0.123 [0.302] 0.121 [0.309]
Illiterate 2.253 [0.061]*
cons −1.684 [0.000]*** −2.211 [0.000]*** −3.251 [0.000]*** 3.286 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3235 3235 2812 2812
Pseudo R2 0.0117 0.0134 0.0232 0.0244
chi2 37.70 40.64 66.82 70.23
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.201 [0.024]** 0.238 [0.008]*** 0.344 [0.001]*** 0.345 [0.001]***
W4 0.579 [0.000]*** 0.645 [0.000]*** 0.723 [0.000]*** 0.721 [0.000]***
Age 0.0127 [0.267] 0.0222 [0.147] 0.0227 [0.139]
Age2 −0.000289 [0.014]** −0.000346 [0.019]** −0.000350 [0.018]**
Male −0.102 [0.175] −0.128 [0.117] −0.124 [0.126]
No. of children −0.0561 [0.134] −0.0560 [0.135]
Single 0.160 [0.281] 0.154 [0.298]
Married 0.262 [0.012]** 0.261 [0.013]**
Illiterate
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Table A.20 (Continued )
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
cons 0.108 [0.080]* 0.215 [0.400] −0.241 [0.507] −0.254 [0.485]
No. of observations 3037 3037 2659 2656
Pseudo R2 0.0101 0.0246 0.0301 0.0298
chi2 40.83 95.20 99.06 97.93
Unpaid putnamian work Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 1.234 [0.000]*** 1.224 [0.000]*** 1.21 [0.000]*** 1.208 [0.000]***
w4 1.637 [0.000]*** 1.63 [0.000]*** 1.599 [0.000]*** 1.601 [0.000]***
Age 0.0434 [0.009]*** 0.0531 [0.008]*** 0.0526 [0.008]***
Age2 −0.000524 [0.002]*** −0.000605 [0.002]*** −0.0006 [0.002]***
Male 0.194 [0.051]* 0.216 [0.037]** 0.211 [0.040]**
No. of children −0.00257 [0.958] −0.0028 [0.954]
Single 0.137 [0.446] 0.142 [0.429]
Married 0.0389 [0.773] 0.0396 [0.770]
Illiterate
cons −2.714 [0.000]*** −3.549 [0.000]*** −3.84 [0.000]*** −3.823 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3235 3235 2812 2809
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.0664 0.0594 0.0596
chi2 122.7 130.6 102.2 102.6
Happiness Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.416 [0.000]*** 0.433 [0.000]*** 0.511 [0.000]*** 0.510 [0.000]***
w4 0.518 [0.000]*** 0.545 [0.000]*** 0.685 [0.000]*** 0.687 [0.000]***
Age 0.0155 [0.159] −0.0572 [0.000]*** −0.0579 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.000260 [0.024]** 0.000391 [0.007]*** 0.000396 [0.007]***
Male −0.0569 [0.421] 0.00439 [0.954] 0.00166 [0.983]
No. of children −0.00201 [0.956] −0.00203 [0.955]
Single −0.291 [0.040]** −0.287 [0.043]**
Married 0.781 [0.000]*** 0.783 [0.000]***
Illiterate −1.427 [0.448]
cut1 −4.958 [0.000]*** −4.890 [0.000]*** −6.052 [0.000]*** −6.070 [0.000]***
cut2 −2.671 [0.000]*** −2.600 [0.000]*** 3.835 [0.000]*** −3.852 [0.000]***
cut3 0.745 [0.000]*** 0.837 [0.000]*** −0.440 [0.203] −0.455 [0.189]
No. of observations 3189 2775 2775
Pseudo R2 0.00765 0.433 0.0321 0.0323
chi2 42.79 147.8 148.2
p-values in brackets: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table A.21
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Norway.
Norway
Putnam’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 1.168 [0.000]*** 1.162 [0.000]*** 1.138 [0.000]*** 1.138 [0.000]***
Age 0.0423 [0.008]*** 0.0303 [0.148] 0.0303 [0.148]
Age2 −0.000479 [0.005]*** −0.000367 [0.083]* −0.000367 [0.083]*
Male −0.119 [0.179] −0.0696 [0.460] −0.0696 [0.460]
No. of children 0.104 [0.013]** 0.104 [0.013]**
Single 0.593 [0.002]*** 0.593 [0.002]***
Married 0.186 [0.157] 0.186 [0.157]
Illiterate
cons −0.955 [0.000]*** −1.695 [0.000]*** −1.812 [0.000]*** −1.812 [0.000]***
No. of observations 2290 2290 1997 1997
Pseudo R2 0.0574 0.0608 0.0562 0.0562
chi2 170.2 176.8 138.4 138.4
Olson’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.430 [0.000]*** 0.434 [0.000]*** 0.611 [0.000]*** 0.611 [0.000]***
Age 0.170 [0.000]*** 0.158 [0.000]*** 0.158 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.00177 [0.000]*** −0.00163 [0.000]*** −0.00163 [0.000]***
Male 0.563 [0.000]*** 0.617 [0.000]*** 0.617 [0.000]***
No. of children −0.0184 [0.656] −0.0184 [0.656]
Single −0.630 [0.002]*** 0.630 [0.002]***
Married 0.0781 [0.552] 0.0781 [0.552]
Illiterate
cons −0.270 [0.000]*** −4.150 [0.000]*** −4.016 [0.000]*** −4.016 [0.000]***
No. of observations 2290 2290 1997 1997
Pseudo R2 0.00823 0.0586 0.0648 0.0648
chi2 25.95 162.6 158.5 158.5
Other groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.746 [0.000]*** 0.750 [0.000]*** 0.707 [0.000]*** 0.707 [0.000]***
Age 0.0254 [0.140] 0.0147 [0.500] 0.0147 [0.500]
Age2 −0.000270 [0.134] −0.000164 [0.454] −0.000164 [0.454]
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Table A.21 (Continued )
Other groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
Male 0.343 [0.000]*** 0.348 [0.001]*** 0.348 [0.001]***
No. of children 0.0368 [0.400] 0.0368 [0.400]
Single 0.0978 [0.622] 0.0978 [0.622]
Married 0.0518 [0.712] 0.0518 [0.712]
Illiterate
cons −1.346 [0.000]*** −2.052 [0.000]*** −1.884 [0.000]*** −1.884 [0.000]***
No. of observations 2290 2290 1997 1997
Pseudo R2 0.0226 0.0283 0.0234 0.0234
chi2 59.62 74.71 55.63 55.63
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.180 [0.047]** 0.181 [0.049]** 0.190 [0.068]* 0.189 [0.069]*
w3 0.191 [0.037]** 0.173 [0.062]* 0.193 [0.067]* 0.217 [0.040]**
Age 0.0449 [0.001]*** 0.0368 [0.032]** 0.0354 [0.040]**
Age2 −0.000670 [0.000]*** −0.000588 [0.001]*** −0.000569 [0.001]***
Male 0.117 [0.117] 0.127 [0.109] 0.127 [0.109]
No. of children 0.0325 [0.358] −0.0334 [0.346]
Single −0.177 [0.228] −0.172 [0.243]
Married 0.125 [0.219] 0.129 [0.209]
Illiterate −1.400 [0.009]***
cons 0.441 [0.000]*** −0.0966 [0.748] 0.0752 [0.847] 0.0936 [0.811]
No. of observations 3232 3232 2968 2968
Pseudo R2 0.00128 0.0233 0.0240 0.0260
chi2 5.448 96.37 91.16 97.06
Unpaid putnamian work Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.823 [0.000]*** 0.813 [0.000]*** 0.938 [0.000]*** 0.938 [0.000]***
Age 0.0926 [0.000]*** 0.0729 [0.005]*** 0.0729 [0.005]***
Age2 −0.000953 [0.000]*** −0.000781 [0.002]*** −0.000781 [0.002]***
Male 0.0196 [0.852] 0.114 [0.308] 0.114 [0.308]
No. of children 0.18 [0.000]*** 0.18 [0.000]***
Single 0.744 [0.002]*** 0.744 [0.002]***
Married 0.48 [0.005]*** 0.48 [0.005]***
Illiterate
cons −1.84 [0.000]*** −3.831 [0.000]*** −4.269 [0.000]*** −4.269 [0.000]***
No. of observations 2290 2290 1997 1997
Pseudo R2 0.0252 0.0348 0.0438 0.0438
chi2 55.55 72.37 78.11 78.11
Happiness Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.0877 [0.318] 0.0876 [0.321] 0.0916 [0.364] 0.0912 [0.368]
W3 0.125 [0.159] 0.114 [0.200] 0.184 [0.072]* 0.211 [0.040]**
Age −0.00541 [0.671] −0.0760 [0.000]*** −0.0782 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.0000372 [0.787] 0.000622 [0.000]*** 0.000650 [0.000]***
Male −0.177 [0.013]** −0.196 [0.010]** −0.196 [0.010]**
No. of children −0.0686 [0.049]** −0.0687 [0.050]**
Single −0.371 [0.010]** −0.365 [0.012]**
Married 0.844 [0.000]*** 0.847 [0.000]***
Illiterate −1.783 [0.002]***
cut1 −4.834 [0.000]*** −5.260 [0.000]*** −6.674 [0.000]*** −6.727 [0.000]***
cut2 −2.639 [0.000]*** −3.062 [0.000]*** −4.451 [0.000]*** −4.496 [0.000]***
cut3 0.960 [0.000]*** 0.555 [0.040]** 0.728 [0.040]** −0.758 [0.032]**
No. of observations 3402 3109 3109
Pseudo R2 0.000365 0.0876 0.0264 0.0288
chi2 2.058 133.8 148.8
p-values in brackets: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table A.22
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Sweden
Sweden
Putnam’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 1218 [0.000]*** 1.219 [0.000]*** 1.192 [0.000]*** 1.193 [0.000]***
w4 3.039 [0.000]*** 3.036 [0.000]*** 3.032 [0.000]*** 3.038 [0.000]***
Age 0.0191 [0.236] 0.0140 [0.493] 0.0134 [0.510]
Age2 −0.000239 [0.176] −0.000201 [0.344] −0.000194 [0.360]
Male −0.189 [0.030]** −0.178 [0.053]* −0.177 [0.054]*
No. of children 0.00808 [0.863] 0.00795 [0.865]
Single 0.313 [0.066]* 0.312 [0.067]*
Married 0.196 [0.082]* 0.199 [0.077]*
Illiterate −0.856 [0.475]
coris −0.982 [0.000]*** −1.197 [0.001]*** 1.220 [0.007]*** −1.210 [0.007]***
No. of observations 3016 2962 2700 2700
Pseudo R2 0.203 0.209 0.202 0.202
chi2 615.0 630.0 552.2 552.0
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Table A.22 (Continued )
Olson’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.555 [0.000]*** 0.589 [0.000]*** 0.730 [0.000]*** 0.732 [0.000]***
w4 0.887 [0.000]*** 0.935 [0.000]*** 1.074 [0.000]*** 1.081 [0.000]***
Age 0.210 [0.000]*** 0.201 [0.000]*** 0.200 [0.000]***
Age2 −0.00239 [0.000]*** 0.00230 [0.000]*** −0.00229 [0.000]***
Male 0.261 [0.001]*** 0.251 [0.003]*** 0.254 [0.003]***
No. of children −0.0434 [0.330] −0.0433 [0.331]
Single −0.557 [0.000]*** −0.559 [0.000]***
Married 0.0607 [0.566] −0.0550 [0.603]
Illiterate −1.396 [0.323]
coris −0.0377 [0.560] −4.162 [0.000]*** 3.896 [0.000]*** −3.876 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3016 2962 2700 2700
Pseudo R2 0.0231 0.0865 0.0868 0.0872
chi2 91.50 233.6 209.9 210.4
Other groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
W2 0.898 [0.000]*** 0.926 [0.000]*** 0.973 [0.000]*** 0.974 [0.000]***
w4 1.022 [0.000]*** 1.042 [0.000]*** 1.105 [0.000]*** 1.110 [0.000]***
Age 0.0307 [0.043]** 0.00777 [0.673] 0.00697 [0.706]
Age2 −0.000191 [0.240] 0.0000116 [0.951] 0.0000206 [0.914]
Male 0.0769 [0.348] 0.130 [0.126] 0.131 [0.123]
No. of children 0.0581 [0.161] 0.0579 [0.163]
Single 0.260 [0.087]* −0.262 [0.086]*
Married 0.129 [0.203] 0.133 [0.191]
Illiterate −0.899 [0.439]
cons −1.514 [0.000]*** −2.517 [0.000]*** 2.137 [0.000]*** −2.124 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3016 2962 2700 2700
Pseudo R2 0.0303 0.0384 0.0354 0.0356
chi2 102.1 123.9 114.9 115.6
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.397 [0.000]*** 0.375 [0.000]*** 0.481 [0.000]*** 0.481 [0.000]***
w3 0.120 [0.204] 0.114 [0.234] 0.234 [0.028]** 0.235 [0.028]**
W4 0.407 [0.000]*** 0.393 [0.000]*** 0.527 [0.000]*** 0.528 [0.000]***
Age 0.0352 [0.005]*** 0.0245 [0.112] 0.0244 [0.113]
Age2 −0.000479 [0.000]*** −0.000383 [0.015]** −0.000382 [0.015]**
Male 0.0574 [0.402] 0.0582 [0.417] 0.0585 [0.415]
No. of children −0.0328 [0.373] −0.0328 [0.373]
Single −0.0952 [0.440] −0.0952 [0.440]
Married 0.347 [0.000]*** 0.348 [0.000]***
Illiterate −0.178 [0.819]
cons 0.271 [0.000]*** 0.240 [0.389] −0.205 [0.554] −0.203 [0.557]
No. of observations 3751 3700 3452 3452
Pseudo R2 0.00541 0.0121 0.0172 0.0172
chi2 26.81 58.33 75.96 76.09
Unpaid putnamian work Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.545 [0.000]*** 0.522 [0.000]*** 0.434 [0.000]*** 0.434 [0.000]***
w4 1.466 [0.000]*** 1.475 [0.000]*** 1.406 [0.000]*** 1.407 [0.000]***
Age 0.0285 [0.072]* 0.0199 [0.288] 0.0199 [0.290]
Age2 −0.000359 [0.037]** −0.000297 [0.129] −0.000296 [0.130]
Male 0.28 [0.001]*** 0.291 [0.001]*** 0.292 [0.001]***
No. of children 0.0466 [0.279] 0.0466 [0.279]
Single 0.19 [0.210] 0.19 [0.210]
Married 0.181 [0.086]* 0.181 [0.085]*
Illiterate −0.0574 [0.959]
cons −1.529 [0.000]*** −2.144 [0.000]*** −2.034 [0.000]*** 2.033 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3016 2962 2700 2700
Pseudo R2 0.0604 0.0667 0.0607 0.0607
chi2 209.7 228.2 196 196
Happiness Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w2 0.463 [0.000]*** 0.461 [0.000]*** 0.633 [0.000]*** 0.633 [0.000]***
w3 0.393 [0.000]*** 0.393 [0.000]*** 0.607 [0.000]*** 0.608 [0.000]***
W4 0.236 [0.010]*** 0.229 [0.013]** 0.464 [0.000]*** 0.465 [0.000]***
Age −0.0182 [0.115] −0.112 [0.000]*** −0.112 [0.000]***
Age2 0.000125 [0.321] 0.000970 [0.000]*** 0.000972 [0.000]***
Male −0.274 [0.000]*** −0.298 [0.000]*** −0.298 [0.000]***
No. of children −0.0324 [0.339] −0.0324 [0.339]
Single −0.760 [0.000]*** −0.760 [0.000]***
Married 0.939 [0.000]*** 0.940 [0.000]***
Illiterate −0.277 [0.804]
cut1 −4.406 [0.000]*** 5.082 [0.000]*** −6.948 [0.000]*** −6.952 [0.000]***
cut2 −2.719 [0.000]*** −3.404 [0.000]*** −5.304 [0.000]*** −5.308 [0.000]***
cut3 0.828 [0.000]*** 0.159 [0.528] −1.596 [0.000]*** −1.599 [0.000]***
No. of observations 3982 3928 3662 3662
Pseudo R2 0.00452 0.00915 0.0463 0.0463
chi2 32.22 60.20 268.4 268.4
p-values in brackets: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table A.23
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Finland.
Finland
Putnam’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w4 0.577 [0.000]*** 0.575 [0.000]*** 0.640 [0.000]*** 0.640 [0.000]***
Age 0.0113 [0.552] −0.00449 [0.833] −0.00449 [0.833]
Age2 −0.0000883 [0.668] 0.0000581 [0.796] 0.0000581 [0.796]
Male −0.138 [0.189] −0.140 [0.197] −0.140 [0.197]
No. of children −0.0149 [0.692] −0.0149 [0.692]
Single −0.153 [0.390] −0.153 [0.390]
Married 0.232 [0.076]* 0.232 [0.076]*
Illiterate
cons 0.191 [0.021]** −0.0368 [0.930] 0.232 [0.619] 0.232 [0.619]
No. of observations 1626 1605 1532 1532
Pseudo R2 0.0138 0.0152 0.0183 0.0183
chi2 29.38 31.99 36.47 36.47
Olson’s groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w4 −0.243 [0.019]** −0.105 [0.331] 0.00879 [0.939] 0.00879 [0.939]
Age 0.206 [0.000]*** 0.175 [0.000]*** 0.175 [0.000]***
Age2 0.00228 [0.000]*** −0.00197 [0.000]*** −0.00197 [0.000]***
Male −0.0708 [0.497] −0.0829 [0.445] −0.0829 [0.445]
No. of children −0.0481 [0.207] −0.0481 [0.207]
Single −0.297 [0.107] −0.297 [0.107]
Married 0.558 [0.000]*** 0.558 [0.000]***
Illiterate
cons −0.0953 [0.249] −4.281 [0.000]*** −3.821 [0.000]*** −3.821 [0.000]***
No. of observations 1626 1605 1532 1532
Pseudo R2 0.00246 0.0513 0.0664 0.0664
chi2 5.479 96.65 124.1 124.1
Other groups Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w4 −0.0754 [0.524] 0.0986 [0.411] −0.0114 [0.928] −0.0114 [0.928]
age 0.0315 [0.158] 0.00862 [0.725] 0.00862 [0.725]
Age2 −0.000129 [0.581] 0.0000810 [0.748] 0.0000810 [0.748]
Male 0.0233 [0.840] −0.0370 [0.754] −0.0370 [0.754]
No. of children 0.00475 [0.901] 0.00475 [0.901]
Single −0.137 [0.522] −0.137 [0.522]
Married 0.343 [0.015]** 0.343 [0.015]**
Illiterate
cons −1.036 [0.000]*** −2.095 [0.000]*** −1.771 [0.001]*** −1.771 [0.001]***
No. of observations 1626 1605 1532 1532
Pseudo R2 0.00022] 0.0154 0.0202 0.0202
chi2 0.407 26.96 33.81 33.81
Trust in others Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w3 −0.568 [0.000]*** −0.594 [0.000]*** −0.518 [0.000]*** −0.518 [0.000]***
w4 −0.221 [0.041]** −0.237 [0.031]** −0.143 [0.203] −0.143 [0.203]
Age −0.0312 [0.031]** −0.0442 [0.006]*** −0.0442 [0.006]***
Age2 0.000293 [0.061]* 0.000415 [0.014]** 0.000415 [0.014]**
Male −0.140 [0.083]* −0.171 [0.040]** −0.171 [0.040]**
No. of children 0.0139 [0.639] 0.0139 [0.639]
Single 0.191 [0.144] 0.191 [0.144]
Married 0.367 [0.000]*** 0.367 [0.000]***
Illiterate
cons 0.520 [0.000]*** 1.327 [0.000]*** 1.341 [0.000]*** 1.341 [0.000]***
No. of observations 2542 2520 2451 2451
Pseudo R2 0.00884 0.0117 0.0166 0.0166
chi2 30.61 39.74 53.31 53.31
Unpaid putnamian work Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w4 −0.138 [0.214] −0.151 [0.178] 0.0369 [0.756] −0.0369 [0.756]
Age 0.0427 [0.037]** 0.0167 [0.462] 0.0167 [0.462]
Age2 −0.000349 [0.108] −0.000103 [0.662] −0.000103 [0.662]
Male 0.0726 [0.507] 0.0656 [0.560] 0.0656 [0.560]
No. of children 0.00492 [0.898] 0.00492 [0.898]
Single −0.187 [0.342] −0.187 [0.342]
Married 0.304 [0.027]** 0.304 [0.027]**
Illiterate
cons −0.655 [0.000]*** −1.795 [0.000]*** −1.394 [0.006]*** −1.394 [0.006]***
No. of observations 1626 1605 1532 1532
Pseudo R2 0.00078 0.0062 0.0109 0.0109
chi2 1.545 12.9 20.54 20.54
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Table A.23 (Continued )
Happiness Mean values Demographic controls Familiar status Education
w3 0.236 [0.032]** 0.188 [0.091]* 0.418 [0.000]*** 0.418 [0.000]***
w4 0.202 [0.071]* 0.182 [0.109] 0.429 [0.000]*** 0.429 [0.000]***
Age −0.0695 [0.000]*** −0.140 [0.000]*** −0.140 [0.000]***
Age2 0.000637 [0.000]*** 0.00131 [0.000]*** 0.00131 [0.000]***
Male −0.216 [0.010]*** −0.205 [0.018]** −0.205 [0.018]**
No. of children −0.0460 [0.160] −0.0460 [0.160]
Single −0.553 [0.000]*** −0.553 [0.000]***
Married 0.833 [0.000]*** 0.833 [0.000]***
Illiterate
cut1 −4.210 [0.000]*** −6.003 [0.000]*** −7.287 [0.000]*** −7.287 [0.000]***
cut2 −2.141 [0.000]*** −3.937 [0.000]*** −5.237 [0.000]*** −5.237 [0.000]***
cut3 1.353 [0.000]*** −0.398 [0.235] −1.533 [0.000]*** −1.533 [0.000]***
No. of observations 2575 2482 2482
Pseudo R2 0.00110 0.188 0.0383 0.0383
chi2 4.891 145.1 145.1
p-values in brackets: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Appendix B.
Figs. B.1–B.19
Fig. B.1. Relational social capital trends for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. (a) trust in others; (b) membership in Putnam’s groups; (c) unpaid voluntary work in putnamian
groups.
Fig. B.2. Trends about membership and unpaid voluntary work in Olson’s and other groups for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. Membership in Olson’s (a) and other groups
(b); performing unpaid voluntary work in olsonian (c) and other (d) groups.
Author's personal copy
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Fig. B.3. Trends about confidence in institutions for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. (a) Confidence in religious institutions; (b) confidence in judicial system.
Fig. B.4. Trends about confidence in institutions for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. (a) Confidence in parliament; (b) confidence in civil services.
Fig. B.5. Trends about confidence in institutions for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. (a) Confidence in press; (b) confidence in educational system.
Fig. B.6. Trends about confidence in institutions for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. (a) Confidence in police; (b) confidence in armed forces.
Fig. B.7. Trends about confidence in major companies for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000.
Author's personal copy
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Fig. B.8. Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for Italy from 1980 to 2000.
Fig. B.9. Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for the Netherlands from 1980 to 2000.
Fig. B.10. Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for Sweden from 1980 to 2000.
Author's personal copy
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Fig. B.11. Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for France from 1980 to 2000.
Fig. B.12. Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for Denmark from 1980 to 2000.
Fig. B.13. Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for Norway from 1980 to 2000.
Author's personal copy
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Fig. B.14. Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for Germany from 1980 to 2000.
Fig. B.15. Subjective well-being trends for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000.
Fig. B.16. Subjective well-being trends for (a) Italy and (b) Netherlands from 1980 to 2000.
Fig. B.17. Subjective well-being trends for (a) Sweden and (b) France from 1980 to 2000.
Author's personal copy
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Fig. B.18. Subjective well-being trends for (a) Denmark and (b) Norway from 1980 to 2000.
Fig. B.19. Subjective well-being trends for Germany from 1980 to 2000.
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